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Diarmuid Torney and Noriko Fujiwara 
Abstract 
Among the many unresolved issues on the agenda of 
the forthcoming UN climate change negotiations in 
Cancún is the issue of what will happen to the Kyoto 
Protocol, since at present, there will be no targets for 
greenhouse (GHG) emissions from developed 
countries under the Protocol beyond 2012. To 
illuminate this aspect of the Protocol, this Policy Brief 
looks closer at the nature of the commitments and the 
compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol. We 
argue that the compliance regime of the Protocol is 
not as robust as many of the Protocol’s supporters 
might think. The precise legal form of the 
commitments in the climate regime may have little 
impact on whether countries actually achieve their 
targets. Instead, we argue, negotiators should focus on 
agreeing a framework of commitments that are 
credible and enforceable, rather than focus 
excessively on the legal form of those commitments.  
Introduction 
Next week, climate change negotiators will gather in 
Cancún, Mexico, for the latest round of UN climate 
change negotiations. Many issues remain unresolved 
going into the two-week conference, and for many 
months expectations have been progressively lowered 
in order to avoid a repeat of the Copenhagen climate 
conference last December. Among the range of 
matters yet to be agreed at the negotiations, an 
overarching issue concerns the legal form of a 
possible agreement, and the related issue of the future 
of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The first commitment period of the Protocol runs until 
the end of 2012, after which there are currently no 
further commitments in the framework of the climate 
regime for emission reductions or limitations in 
respect of developed countries. Those who support the 
Kyoto Protocol’s approach to tackling climate change 
wish to create a second commitment period, which 
would set targets for developed country emissions for 
the period beyond 2012. Supporters of the Protocol 
point to the fact that it represents the only legally 
binding international instrument to limit emissions. 
On closer examination, however, the consequences of 
compliance or non-compliance with commitments are 
less clear-cut than one might imagine. Looking at 
what is at stake in the debate over the future of the 
Kyoto Protocol, this paper argues that the nature of 
international commitments, the effectiveness of a 
compliance system and consequences of non-
compliance need to be understood in an integrated 
manner. 
1.  Setting the context 
The institutional architecture of the 
climate change regime 
The existing international, legal and institutional 
architecture on climate change consists primarily of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC or the Convention) and 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. This 
international architecture has evolved over time with 
the adoption of new rules, procedures and 2 | Torney & Fujiwara 
mechanisms to operationalise the Convention and the 
Protocol,
1 such as the Marrakech Accords of 2001. 
Furthermore, corresponding domestic institutional 
frameworks for additional policies and measures have 
been developed, for example within the EU since 
2001. 
The overall objective of the Convention is “to 
achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system”. Yet beyond an aspirational target 
of returning global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2000, the Convention did not 
contain specific emission reduction or limitation 
targets for each country. The Convention stipulates 
the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” for 
developed countries and economies in transition, 
known as ‘Annex I parties’ (so-called because they 
are listed in Annex I of the Convention), and non-
Annex I parties. To address this perceived 
shortcoming of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol 
(Annex B) set quantified emission limitation and 
reduction obligations for Annex I parties. The overall 
target of Annex I parties is a 5.2% reduction below 
1990 levels of GHG emissions, solely during the ‘first 
commitment period’ from 2008 to 2012.  
What the architects did not anticipate then, however, 
was a long delay in the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol owing to the ‘55-55’ rule.
2 While the 
Convention was agreed in 1992 and entered into force 
in 1994, taking just two years, the Protocol was 
initially adopted in December 1997 but only entered 
into force in February 2005, taking more than seven 
years. The text of the Protocol stipulates that 
negotiations towards a second commitment period 
should commence “at least seven years before the end 
of the first commitment period” (Art. 3.9). Since the 
first commitment period ends in 2012, the 1
st Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP1) took the 
decision to initiate consideration of further 
commitments for Annex I parties in December 2005 
(see Art. 3.9).
3  
                                                      
1 These decisions have been made by either the Conference 
of the Parties or the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  
2 To come into force, the Kyoto Protocol needed to be 
ratified by at least 55 parties to the UNFCCC, and by 
countries representing at least 55% of total Annex I GHG 
emissions (Art. 25.1). To date, the Protocol has been 
ratified by 193 parties (see UNFCCC website, “Status of 
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol”, UNFCCC Secretariat, 
Bonn,  http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ 
ratification/items/2613.php). 
3 See Decision 1/CMP.1 in UNFCCC (2006b) 
(http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf). 
Near the end of 2007, a two-year framework for 
negotiations – the so-called ‘Bali Action Plan’ – was 
launched with a view to reaching an agreed outcome 
in Copenhagen in 2009. This involved a compromise 
solution of creating two negotiating tracks – the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) 
and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (AWG-LCA). The 
AWG-KP, as the name suggests, aims at agreeing on 
targets for Annex I parties to limit and reduce GHG 
emissions during a second commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. the period beyond 2012) 
while maintaining the clear differentiation of 
responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I 
parties, a key demand of developing countries. In 
return, developing countries accepted under the 
AWG-LCA that negotiations will address enhanced 
mitigation actions by both developed and developing 
countries, which was a key demand of the US, 
although these respective actions are framed 
differently.
4 The two negotiation tracks reported on 
progress in their work, but did not conclude in 
Copenhagen. The mandates of the two AWGs were 
extended until the 16
th Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in Cancún and four meeting sessions were held 
during 2010, in Bonn in April, June and August, and 
in Tianjin, China in October. 
The Copenhagen Accord, the text agreed by heads of 
state outside the two-track process, is short of yielding 
a legally binding power over formal commitments by 
parties, but provides political guidance for the 
continuation of negotiations for a future agreement 
without specifying an end date.
5 The legal status of 
the Accord is uncertain, as it was only taken note of 
by the COP rather than being adopted as a formal 
COP decision. Nevertheless, 140 parties have 
communicated their support for the Copenhagen 
                                                      
4 See the Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, 1(b) in 
UNFCCC (2008):  
Enhanced national/international action on 
mitigation of climate change, includ[es], inter 
alia, consideration of: (i) Measurable, 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate 
mitigation commitments or actions, including 
quantified emission limitation and reduction 
objectives, by all developed country Parties, 
while ensuring the comparability of efforts 
among them, taking into account differences in 
their national circumstances; (ii) Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties in the context of sustainable 
development, supported and enabled by 
technology, financing and capacity-building, in 
a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. 
5 For details, see Decision 2, CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, 
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Accord to the UNFCCC Secretariat,
6 some of which, 
be they developed countries or emerging economies, 
submitted pledges for quantitative commitments in the 
months following the Copenhagen summit. 
Commitment periods of the Kyoto 
Protocol 
As noted above, the negotiations under the AWG-KP 
track include consideration of a possible second 
commitment period under the Protocol. This would be 
likely to involve an amendment to Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol containing commitments for 
developed countries (Art. 3.9) in the form of a 
decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP). The decision will be then subject to 
acceptance by each party. .How long it will take to 
amend Annex B or whether the amendment can be 
made to update the commitments in 2013 is another 
matter. Art. 20.3 of the Protocol stipulates that “[t]he 
Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on 
any proposed amendment to this Protocol by 
consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment 
shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths 
majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the 
meeting” (emphasis added).
7 
The failure to agree at Copenhagen on further 
commitments for developed countries within the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol has led to concerns 
that there may be a gap between the first and 
subsequent commitment periods under the Protocol. 
The implications of a gap go beyond the obvious fact 
that that those developed countries that have ratified 
the Protocol would be left without emission targets 
from 2013. Such a gap could also affect the 
functioning of the so-called ‘flexible mechanisms’ 
(the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint 
Implementation and emissions trading), and it would 
have further ramifications on the operation of the 
                                                      
6 See the UNFCCC website, “Copenhagen Accord”, 
UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn,  http://unfccc.int/home/ 
items/5262.php for details. 
7 See the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, adopted 10 December 
1997, United Nations, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 25 March 
1998 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf). For 
an example, the proposal by Belarus to amend Annex B is 
illustrative. Parties to the Protocol adopted the amendment 
by CMP Decision in 2006, but to date the amendment has 
not entered into force, being accepted by only 23 parties to 
the Protocol (see Decision 10, CMP.2, in UNFCCC 
(2007)). See also the UNFCCC website, “Amendment to 
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol” (http://unfccc.int 
/kyoto_protocol/amendment_to_annex_b/items/4082.php). 
compliance mechanism of the Protocol (as discussed 
below).  
These issues were raised in the recent negotiating 
sessions of the AWG-KP in Bonn in August 2010 and 
later in Tianjin, China in October. Upon parties’ 
request, the UNFCCC Secretariat provided a note 
prior to the August 2010 negotiating session in Bonn 
that considers legal options to ensure there is no gap 
between commitment periods.
8 Such options include 
i) formally amending the Protocol, which would 
require acceptance of the amendment by at least three-
quarters of the parties to the Protocol (as noted 
earlier); ii) provisional application of an amendment; 
and iii) extension of the first commitment period. It 
also discusses potential legal implications of a gap in 
commitment periods, including effects on the 
reporting obligations of parties, the operation of the 
flexible mechanisms and the functioning of the 
compliance system. 
Entanglement between the legal form and 
the next commitment period 
There is a range of views among parties on the 
possible future commitment periods of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the appropriate relationship between the 
potential outcomes of the two tracks. As the above 
sections show, these issues are distinct and deserve 
careful analysis on their own. At the same time, they 
are often entangled in continuing discussions on the 
two-track negotiation process.  
While the two-track process was a carefully 
constructed compromise, it was never clear how the 
negotiating outcomes of the two AWGs would take 
respective legal forms and how they would relate to 
each other (see Müller et al., 2010, pp. 3-5 for a fuller 
discussion). 
In principle developing countries are generally keen 
to see an amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol to establish a second commitment period, 
with a non-binding outcome in the AWG-LCA track. 
Many developed country parties support the creation 
of a ‘single legal instrument’ that would merge the 
Kyoto Protocol and LCA negotiating tracks, building 
upon successful elements of the Kyoto Protocol and 
including all parties in the legal framework, although 
with differing obligations. 
The EU’s position on this issue has shifted in recent 
months. Prior to Copenhagen, the EU argued for a 
single legal instrument, as above, together with other 
developed countries. At the most recent negotiating 
sessions in August and October 2010, the EU repeated 
its preference for a single, legally binding agreement, 
while pointing out that it could be flexible on the form 
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of the outcome as long as it is legally binding.
9 
However, the October meeting of the Environment 
Council marked a shift in the EU’s orientation on this 
matter. The Council’s conclusions highlighted the 
EU’s willingness to agree to a second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol, provided that a broader 
framework can be found to engage all major 
economies.
10 
Since so much is made of the fact that the Kyoto 
Protocol is a legally binding agreement, it is worth 
examining in greater depth what this means in 
practice. Specifically, what consequences flow from 
compliance or non-compliance with legally binding 
commitments in the case of the Kyoto Protocol? 
2.  Analysing key concepts in an 
integrated manner: Commitments, 
compliance and consequences under 
the Kyoto Protocol 
Commitments and compliance could be seen as the 
two sides of one coin. The question of the legal nature 
of commitments is closely linked to the issue of 
compliance. Presumably, one of the principal reasons 
a legally binding climate treaty has so many advocates 
is because enshrining states’ commitments in 
international law would seem to make compliance 
more likely. 
There is an apparent anomaly in the Kyoto Protocol, 
however: on the one hand, the emission limitation and 
reduction obligations of Annex B parties (i.e. 
developed countries and economies in transition) 
possess a legally binding character, since they are 
precisely specified in an international treaty that the 
                                                      
9 See “Summary of the Bonn Climate Talks, 2–6 August 
2010”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 478, 
August 2010 (http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12478e.html). 
10 The relevant text from the Conclusions adopted on 14 
October by the Environment Council (Council of the 
European Union (Environment), 2010) is the following:  
[The Environment Council] CONFIRMS its 
willingness to consider a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol, as part of a 
wider outcome including the perspective of the 
global and comprehensive framework engaging 
all major economies, while reiterating, in this 
regard, its preference for a single legally binding 
instrument that would include the essential 
elements of the Kyoto Protocol, building on the 
Copenhagen Accord, reflecting the ambition and 
effectiveness of international action and 
responding to the urgent need for environmental 
integrity (capitalisation as in the original).  
On 28-29 October the European Council endorsed the 
Environment Council conclusions and confirmed its 
willingness to consider a second commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol provided the conditions set out in these 
conclusions are met (European Council, 2010).  
contracting parties have signed and ratified. On the 
other hand, the compliance mechanism of the Protocol 
is non-binding in consequences, stated as follows: 
“Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article 
entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by 
means of an amendment to this Protocol” (Art. 18, 
Kyoto Protocol). If an amendment under this article 
were adopted to make the ‘consequences’ binding, the 
amendment would have to be ratified by parties to the 
Protocol. It would not enter into force until three-
quarters of the parties had signed and ratified the 
amendment, i.e. more than 145 parties. It would only 
bind those parties that had ratified the amendment 
itself, and not any parties that had ratified the original 
Kyoto Protocol but not the amendment (Wang and 
Wiser, 2002, p. 196). In the negotiations that led to 
the creation of the compliance mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the legal character of the 
consequences of non-compliance was hotly contested. 
While the EU and the G77 & China supported legally 
binding consequences, parties within the ‘Umbrella 
Group’ (consisting of Canada, Australia, Japan, the 
Russian Federation and New Zealand, among others) 
opposed them (Halvorssen and Hovi, 2006, p. 164; 
see also Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, p. 151).
11 
The compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol consists 
of a Compliance Committee, agreed upon as part of 
the Marrakech Accords in 2001 and established by 
CMP 1 in 2005, which is composed of two branches – 
a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch. The 
role of the Facilitative Branch is to assist parties in 
their implementation of the Protocol. The role of the 
Enforcement Branch is more judicial in nature. It 
considers whether a party has i) complied with its 
methodological and reporting requirements under the 
Protocol, ii) met the eligibility requirements for 
participating in the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol (the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint 
Implementation, and emissions trading), and iii) met 
its emissions target (i.e. commitment) under the 
Protocol. It is the last of these that is most relevant to 
the subject of this paper and which is considered in 
detail here.  
There will be three kinds of consequences triggered 
by non-compliance regarding the emissions target. If a 
party does not achieve its emissions target in the first 
commitment period, the Enforcement Branch is 
empowered to apply the following consequences: 
i)  for each tonne of emissions by which the party 
has exceeded its target, 1.3 tonnes will be 
deducted from the party’s assigned amount 
                                                      
11 For an overview of the history of the development of the 
compliance mechanisms and procedures of the Kyoto 
Protocol, see Wang and Wiser (2002). National Commitments, Compliance and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol | 5 
units (AAUs, that is, its permitted level of 
emissions) for the next commitment period;  
ii)  the party will be obliged to prepare a detailed 
plan outlining how it will meet its reduced 
target for the next commitment period, and the 
Enforcement Branch will have the power to 
review this plan and assess its feasibility; and  
iii)  the party will be suspended from selling 
emission units.  
While the shortcomings of the deduction approach 
were well recognised, it was adopted because no other 
politically feasible or realistic non-compliance 
response seemed possible (Wang and Wiser, 2002, p. 
196). For example, proposals for payments into a 
‘compliance fund’ by parties that are found to be non-
compliant were deemed by negotiators to be too 
penalising in character and would have been difficult 
to enforce (Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, p. 150). 
So far, the Enforcement Branch has addressed 
questions of implementation with respect to four 
parties: Greece, Canada, Croatia and Bulgaria 
(Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, p. 137).
12 Each of these 
cases concerned the monitoring and reporting 
obligations of the parties concerned under the 
Protocol.  
The Enforcement Branch cannot address questions of 
implementation regarding emission targets during the 
relevant commitment period, since the issue of 
compliance only arises after the end of the 
commitment period. The issue of compliance with 
emissions targets for the first commitment period is 
unlikely to be raised before July 2015. The time frame 
leading to decisions over compliance looks like the 
following (Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, p. 149): 
December 2012  end of the first commitment 
period; 
until 15 April 2014  submission  of  inventories 
for emissions in year 2012; 
until  April  2015  review by the Expert 
Review Team for up to one 
year after the submission of 
inventories; 
April-July  2015  transfer and acquisition of 
AAUs for compliance for 
100 days; and 
July 2015 or later  consideration of compliance 
by the Enforcement Branch. 
It is important to note that until the issue reaches the 
Enforcement Branch, it is the Facilitative Branch that 
                                                      
12 See also the UNFCCC website, “Compliance under the 
Kyoto Protocol” (http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
compliance/items/2875.php). 
is answerable for the potential or likely non-
compliance of a state with its emissions target during 
a compliance period, known as the ‘early warning’ 
function. In other words, there are two police agents 
monitoring the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system: 
the Facilitative Branch responsible for addressing 
likely (non-) compliance ex ante, and the Enforcement 
Branch responsible for actual (non-) compliance ex 
post. To date the Facilitative Branch has failed to do 
so, because of the weakness of the system in that only 
parties can trigger the early-warning function, not the 
Expert Review Team in its reporting (Oberthür and 
Lefeber, 2010, p. 155). The Facilitative Branch is 
mandated to activate the early warning function, but 
has no power to go beyond recommendations 
(Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, pp. 149, 155-156). 
Canada, for example, has publicly declared that it 
does not intend to meet its emissions target for the 
first commitment period of 94% of the 1990 level.
13 
Despite the trajectory of emissions growth derailing 
the Kyoto Protocol target, it will not take additional 
policies or measures that would enable the country to 
get back on track. It is highly doubtful whether the 
Protocol would be capable of inducing compliance on 
the part of states that do not intend to adopt additional 
policies or measures to return to and stay on course. 
This example points to the need for strengthening the 
Facilitative Branch in a future reform of the 
compliance system. 
A high degree of uncertainty about the timing of 
subsequent commitment periods and the level of 
further commitments would undermine the ability of 
the compliance system to function as regards emission 
targets for the first commitment period. If there is no 
agreement on commitments for the next period, the 
deduction approach will not be enforceable. Even if 
parties agree on the continuation of the Protocol, the 
structural design of the consequences for non-
compliance provides an incentive for parties that were 
non-compliant in the first commitment period to 
negotiate a lower target for the second commitment 
period than they might otherwise have done, to take 
account of the added ‘burden’ of the carried-over 
emissions level. Furthermore, a party found to be non-
compliant in the first commitment period could 
simply argue that the consequence is non-binding and 
refuse to be bound by the additional commitment in 
the second period (Halvorssen and Hovi, 2006, p. 
168). 
The Kyoto Protocol is believed to incorporate one of 
the most developed compliance mechanisms of any 
multilateral environmental agreement (Oberthür and 
                                                      
13 In 2008, Canadian emissions were 124% of the 1990 
level. Data derived from World Resources Institute (WRI) 
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, WRI, Washington, D.C. 
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Lefeber, 2010). Still, it is highly doubtful whether the 
Protocol would be capable of inducing compliance on 
the part of states that are not on track and do not wish 
to meet their obligations, as the above example shows, 
or enforcing the consequences of non-compliance on 
them. Furthermore, although it is anticipated that the 
EU-15 in the aggregate will achieve its overall Kyoto 
Protocol commitment of an 8% cut in GHG emissions 
by 2008–12 from 1990 levels (although not all 
member states will do so), a strong argument can be 
made that much of this reduction is helped by factors 
unconnected to the Protocol. Such factors include the 
favourable choice of the base year of 1990 (e.g. the 
collapse of East German heavily-polluting industries 
after 1989 and the move from coal to gas in the UK 
owing to the closure of coal mines contributed 
significantly to declining emissions in the 1990s in 
Europe). There has also been a significant fall in 
output levels since 2008 because of the economic and 
financial recession. These reductions in EU-15 
emissions would have taken place irrespective of the 
Protocol, which is one of the main reasons the EU is 
internally discussing whether to raise the 2020 target 
for GHG emission reductions from 20% to 30% in 
parallel with the international negotiations. The EU’s 
example highlights the importance of the base year, 
the timing of the commitment period and the level of 
commitment, all of which affect the party’s 
performance in compliance.  
3.  Integrated analysis in the context of 
negotiations ahead of Cancún   
Based on the above analysis, the popular debate 
concerning a second commitment period for the 
Kyoto Protocol and the demand for legally binding 
targets for countries within the climate regime appear 
misguided. The ‘compliance pull’ of the Kyoto 
Protocol frequently seems misunderstood, with a 
simplistic view that a legally binding treaty will lead 
to punishment for states that fail to reach their targets. 
Within the multilateral framework of the existing 
climate regime or any currently realistic alternative, 
there is no credible ‘stick’ through which compliance 
could be enforced by the use of punitive sanctions. On 
the other hand, the UNFCCC framework will likely 
be silent about the possibility of a unilateral threat of 
punitive measures in bilateral relations. On the 
contrary, the Protocol’s compliance system attempts 
to restore the lost balance between the initial 
commitment and the actual (under-) performance by 
requesting additional actions from the non-compliant 
party.
14  
                                                      
14 “The consequences of non-compliance with Article 3, 
paragraph 1, of the Protocol to be applied by the 
enforcement branch shall be aimed at the restoration of 
compliance to ensure environmental integrity, and shall 
It is certainly true that some consequences flow from 
whether agreement can be reached among parties on 
the creation of a second commitment period for the 
Kyoto Protocol. These include the continuance of the 
flexible mechanisms and the integrity of the 
compliance system, as noted above. But these are not 
typically the kinds of consequences that appeal to 
supporters of a global climate regime underpinned by 
legally binding commitments. 
In the current landscape of the climate change 
negotiations, this approach in pursuit of legally 
binding targets might be a long shot unless a coalition 
of willing or like-minded parties can be formed. At 
present the EU 2020 target for emission reductions is 
legally binding in EU law and equipped with adequate 
means for compliance in the form of the energy and 
climate change package agreed in 2008 before the 
Poznan conference. The EU may raise the level of 
ambition from 20% to 30% in emission reductions, 
provided other major economies take equivalent 
measures. The EU’s preference remains a single, 
legally binding instrument incorporating essential 
elements of the Kyoto Protocol and building on the 
Copenhagen Accord. Until there is a global and 
comprehensive framework, temporary solutions could 
be sought from unilateral declarations of domestic 
targets that are legally binding in domestic legislation, 
or those that are not necessarily legally binding but 
enforceable.  
All of this is not to argue that legally binding targets 
have no consequences. Such targets can be 
symbolically important, and legally binding targets 
may be more politically difficult to evade than non-
binding targets that would be agreed to in a ‘pledge-
and-review’ kind of process outlined in the 
Copenhagen Accord. In other words, countries may 
try harder to meet legally binding targets, not because 
of the formal legal consequences of non-compliance, 
but because of the reputational costs associated with 
failing to comply with legally binding commitments. 
This dynamic can be seen in the approach India and 
China took when announcing their national carbon-
intensity targets in advance of Copenhagen, and in 
their communication of their commitments to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat in the framework of the 
Copenhagen Accord. Both countries initially had 
reservations about formal association with the 
Accord, and orchestrated the timing of their 
submissions in March 2010. On each occasion, both 
countries were absolutely explicit that theirs were 
domestic targets, and were not internationally binding. 
Notably, however, both India and China set for 
themselves targets that are very likely to be achieved 
                                                                                          
provide for an incentive to comply” (Decision 27, CMP.1, 
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because of their potential links with respective five-
year plans.  
This prospect suggests that governments care a great 
deal about the reputational costs associated with 
failing to meet even voluntarily pledged, non-binding 
targets. In other words, once a target is committed to 
and is subject to international scrutiny, failure to 
achieve that target will generate reputational costs 
regardless of whether the target is binding. 
Concluding remarks 
At present, there is renewed interest in the Kyoto 
Protocol to explore options that could bridge the first 
commitment period and subsequent ones. Some 
consequences of (non-) compliance flow from 
whether there is a second commitment period 
(affecting flexible mechanisms and the integrity of the 
compliance system). Even if there is no agreement 
over the next period, the Protocol’s compliance 
system will remain functional until the middle of 2015 
to assess parties’ performances in the first period.  
The irony is that the Kyoto Protocol stipulates legally 
binding commitments with no legally binding 
consequences for non-compliance. The existing 
compliance system is well designed in theory but not 
functional in practice because the Enforcement 
Branch can intervene only after the end of the first 
period, and the Facilitative Branch cannot initiate 
early warning action on its own. Enhancement of the 
Facilitative Branch is therefore one option to 
strengthen the compliance system of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The compliance system and more generally the 
compliance pull of the Kyoto Protocol frequently 
seems misunderstood, with a simplistic view that a 
legally binding treaty will lead to punishment for 
states that fail or are likely fail to reach their targets. 
On the contrary, the Protocol at best attempts to 
restore the lost balance between the original 
commitment and the actual (under-) performance by 
requesting additional actions from the relevant party 
in future commitment periods. 
In general it is important to note that the symbolic 
politics of a legally binding commitment may be 
significant – i.e. countries may try harder to meet 
legally binding targets, not because of the formal legal 
consequences of non-compliance, but because of the 
reputational costs associated with failing to comply 
with legally binding commitments. But these 
reputational concerns have less to do with the fine 
detail of legal commitments, commitment periods, 
etc.; the legal form may not particularly matter, as 
long as the commitments are pledged in some public 
manner in the international process. In this respect the 
Copenhagen Accord can be seen as a docking station 
to which parties ‘hook’ their pledges.
15 As far as the 
pledges are hooked to an international accord on the 
one hand, and substantiated in domestic legislation on 
the other – not necessarily legally binding in domestic 
law but enforceable with sufficient resources available 
– they could increase the credibility of the parties’ 
commitments. 
Given that GHG emission commitments are by nature 
subject to regular review and adjustments because of 
unforeseen circumstances, as seen in the example of 
the EU’s possible review of the 2020 target, what 
counts most in climate change negotiations would be 
the credibility of a party’s pledge. Credibility would 
be gained through the party’s national legislation, 
low-carbon strategies, action plans or coordination 
measures with other parties, along with its openness, 
ideally to a third party’s review.  
Some essential elements have been overlooked in the 
current focus on the legal form and commitment 
periods in the Kyoto Protocol’s track of international 
negotiations: how to increase the credibility of 
parties’ pledges by ensuring the openness of domestic 
low-carbon strategies, action plans or support 
measures. A shift in the focus from an end product to 
a process that is credible and enforceable would be a 
valuable outcome from negotiations in Cancún. 
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